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PART I 
This article examines how our industrial system is responding to worker 
demands for bi-lateral control over the introduction of technology into the 
workplace. In New Zealand Federated Clerical and Oflice Stafj Employees 
I.A.W. v Wellington Law Practitioners I.U.E. the Arbitration Court was 
asked to arbitrate on the clerical and office staff employees' demand for a 
right to bargain over the introduction of word processing machines.: 
Observing the new micro-electronic technology to be "of great moment in 
industrial relations" affecting "many and varied fields", the Court gave a 
carefully considered decision explaining that it could not sanction the 
demand. As an acknowledged test-case justifying the Court's departure 
from its practice of not providing reasons for its decisions on purely 
arbitral  matter^,^ this decision establishes the precedent the Court will 
follow in dealing with worker demands to mitigate the effects of techno- 
logical change. This is notwithstanding the Court's caution that it is not 
bound by any factual precedent in matters of arbitration3 (expressed also 
in the Memorandum to the Award4). In this instance the Court's reasons 
for rejecting the union's demand constitute a jurisdictional barrier to award 
terms securing bi-lateral control, which effectively negates the freedom the 
Court reserved to modify its approach in future proceedings beyond the 
terms of the Law Practitioners Award. 
In view of the technology clause sanctioned, Part I1 of this article 
examines the range of claims the Court's ruling will allow workers - 
irrespective of individual industry requirements-to pursue in conciliation 
and arbitration. Discussed also are the residual statutory alternatives avail- 
ing workers actually confronting employer decisions to install new tech- 
nology. Part I provides the background. This examines the legal question 
which, despite much of the Court's discussion of economic  matter^,^ 
waj the principal issue for decision: namely, whether the subject of the 
union's demand was an industrial matter within the meaning of the Indus- 
trial Relations Act 19736 capable of satisfying the Act's jurisdictional 
requirement. In view of the Industrial Court's ruling on this requirement 
(1980) A.C.J. 267, per Horn C.J., Sir Leonard Hadley dissenting. (Hereinafter cited 
as the Law Practitioners' case.) For the exact terms of the union's demands, see 
infra, Part 11. 
'Acknowledged ibid., transcript, at 2. 
' Ibid. 
' New Zealand Law Practitioners Award, dated 5 August 1980. 
Principally in response to the submissions or the Federation of Labour (Mr K .  G. 
Douglas advocate). 
' For the definition of "industrial matters", see section 2 (quoted iiifra) 
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only three years previ~usly,~ it suffices to mention that the Arbitration 
Court's decision on the new technology was predictable. 
Involved in the introduction of technology into the workplace may be 
changes in production methods, transfers of operations, new raw materials 
and power sources and permanent shifts in product rnarke t~ .~  Yet from 
neither the worker's nor employer's standpoint does the question regarding 
its introduction present a new genus of industrial dispute. In essence, the 
conflict is between productivity and job security. In almost all cases, new 
technology serves not only to maximise marginal revenue but also to 
minimise marginal cost through a reduction of the labour input. Simplified 
thus, the legal question posed is as old as the industrial system itself: ought 
managerial decisions that enhance profitability but which result in redun- 
dancies to be matters over which a union has a right to bargain? 
In respect of technology, only in degree does this issue impose new 
burdens on the industrial system. When the above question was judicially 
put for the first time in 1904, the judge's example of a labour-saving 
invention was an automatic fuel feeder for the working of locomotive 
furnaces."~ doubt for workers ordinarily performing this function, its 
introduction caused no les5 concern than that expressed by clerical workers 
facing the introduction of word processors. But unlike today's computer 
technology, its impact on the demand for labour was confined in scope to 
that particular function in that particular industry. Also unlike today's 
technology, the development of mechanical labour-saving devices such as 
the railway's automatic fuel feeder kept more or less in tandem with the 
creation of job opportunities. 
"Innovation speeded up" has changed this. This is how one economist 
describes the rate of post-war technological development.1° In contrast to 
the automatic fuel feeder of 1904, today's technological advances benefit 
all sectors-affecting "many and varied fields9'-regardless of industry 
 classification^.^^ Economists believe it is also one of the principal causes of 
post-war industrial instability.12 The rate by which it is accelerating is 
evidenced by the diminishing time interval between the idea and its develop- 
ment into a marketable product.13 Producers of technology force their 
product on the market and the market need to be competitive forces it on 
" N e w  Zealand Bank Officers Z.U.W. v A N Z  Barlkitxg Group Ltd T.C. 71/77, reported 
(1979) Ind. Ct. 219, per Jamieson J .  (Hereinafter cited as the ANZ Bank case.) 
*See generally A. Manson, Technological Change and the Collective Bargaining 
Process (1973) 12 W .  Ont.L.Rev. 173, reviewing the procedures in Canadian col- 
lective agrecments regulating the introduction of technology. 
*Clancy v Butchers' Shop Employees Union (1904) 1 C.L.R. 181 (H.C.A.), per 
O'Connor J., at 206-207. See infra. 
"See A. Shonfield, Modern Capitalism (1974). Ch. 111 entitled as quoted. 
l1 See the Arbitration Court's observations, Law Practitioners' case, 268. 
" Eg., Shonfield, supra, note 10, at 230. 
"See ibid., at 41 (note 4) ,  illustrating with reference to the development of the 
telephone (1 820-76), radio (1867-1902), television (1922-36) and more recently 
transistor technology (1948-53). 
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the employer. As the rate of technological achievement quickens, the 
treadmill employers tread to maintain their competitive advantage becomes 
faster and the burden of increased capital cost-incurred in purchasing 
technology-greater.14 The other side of the cost-accounting equation to 
offset that burden, of course, is the reduction of labour cost, which tech- 
nology itself promotes. 
In the competitive market economy, redundancies do and will continue 
to occur amid the ebb and flow of resources to areas that serve the cus- 
sumer's wants. Traditionally the market economy was able to absorb these 
redundancies, and maintain a reasonably stable demand for labour, by 
virtue of the job opportunities this resource reallocation created. The prob- 
lem post-war technology poses is that the job opportunities it creates cannot 
match the reduction it causes in the overall market demand for labour. 
What will become more apparent this decade is that as fast as the rede- 
ployment of resources primes that demand, the faster will technology 
develop and the greater will become the discrepancy between supply and 
demand for labour. Even the Arbitration Court in the Law Practitioners 
case was disposed to comment: 
It is clear that new technology. whatever its scope, has increased, is increasing 
and will increase. . . . It is also clear that in a number of in~tances in industry, 
specific jobs will become unnecessary and that future job opportunities may not 
be created.15 
Even economists with their faith in economic cycles would agree that this 
is a bleak forecast. The Treasury estimate discussed was of a shortfall of 
250,000 jobs by the year 1985. This, for a country that can expect a work- 
ing population of little more than two million people, depicts the failing 
of our market economy to promote productivity, growth and the job oppor- 
tunities New Zealand's employment policy promises. Now consider the 
legal question in the Law Practitioners case, whether an employer decision 
to introduce technology is a permissible subject of award regulation. 
Immediately the Arbitration Court addressed this question, its references 
to technology could just as well have been references to the automatic fuel 
feeder of 190416-the fact that technology "has increased, is increasing and 
will increase" notwithstanding.17 
(a) The significance of "dispute" in relation to "industrial matters." 
Section 2 of the Industrial Relations Act defines the concept of "indus- 
trial matters" thus : 
Yndustrial matters' means all matters affecting or relating to work done or to be 
done by workers, or the privileges, rights, and duties of employers or workers in 
any industry, . . . 
""with]  the more rapid obsolescence of machines and equipment, as technology 
advances, costs are saddled with a larger proportion of the value of the plant which 
has to be written off each year"; Shonfield, ibid., at 361. 
la See supra, text corresponding to note 9. 
" Supra, note 15. 
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Paragraphs (a) to (c) of the definition specify by way of extension further 
subjects of industrial matters, but it is on the primary definition, above, that 
courts focus in delineating the Act's operation. It takes its effect through 
the definition of "dispute" as: 
. . . any dispute arising between one or more employers or unions or associations 
of employers and one or more unions or associations of workers in relation to 
industrial matters.18 
From the initial conciliation and arbitration statute of 1894,'Qhe Act 
has been structured so as to render the creation of a dispute a jurisdictional 
requirement which must be satisfied to invoke the Act's procedure for its 
~e t t l emen t .~~  Formerly, the significance of this requirement was confined to 
the activities of conciliation councils for the making of collective agree- 
ments and the Court of Arbitration for the making of industry-wide 
awards, fixing the terms and conditions of e rnp l~ymen t .~~  Even so, this 
preserved to the Court of Arbitration (and ultimately the High Court pur- 
suant to its supervisory jurisdiction over the former) a potent instrument of 
control over employment relations; it has long been held that jursidiction 
to regulate non-industrial matters cannot be given or extended by consent, 
and that any provision in a collective agreement or an award of this charac- 
ter will be struck down as an excess of jurisdicti~n.~" 
Since the passage of the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Amend- 
ment Act 1970, however, the jurisdictional requirement has been enhanced 
by the division of disputes into disputes of interest (created to procure 
industry-wi'de awards) and disputes of right (involving any dispute that 
is not a dispute of interest, including inter dia  disputes over the interpreta- 
tion and application of existing awards).23 The 1970 amendment also 
introduced separate procedures for the settlement of rights disputes (invoked 
by convening a disputes committee with power to bind parties subject to a 
right of appeal or the dispute being referred to the Arbitration Court for 
a final and binding settlement). The present Act reproduces these proce- 
dures in substantially unaltered form," and being available only in respect 
of "disputes" they are similarly circumscribed by the concept of industrial 
matters. This means that in adsdition to the former prohibition on non- 
industrial award clauses, the Arbitration Court (or at first instance a dis- 
lqndustrial Relations Act 1973, s. 2. 
"Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1894, adopted soon thereafter by the 
States and Commonwealth of Australia. For an historical account of the similarities 
of language in these statutes see Australian Tramway Employees' Association v 
Prahran and Melvern Tramways Trust (1913) 17 C.L.R. 680 (H.C.A.), at 697-99 
per Isaacs and Rich J.J. 
'O See the authorities cited in Mazengarb and Smith's Industrial Law (4th ed., 1975; 
Smith, Szakats and Schellevis eds.). notes on s. 2, at 11. 
" Cf. now, ss. 82 and 83 of the Industrial Relations Act 1973, granting industry-wide 
coverage formerly reserved for awards to collective agreements reached in concili- 
ation. 
"See New Zealand Waterside Workers' Federation I.A.W. v Frazer [I9241 N.Z.L.R. 
689, particularly at 71 0-1 1 .  
"See now, Industrial Relations Act 1973, s. 2. 
" Industrial Relations Act 1973, ss. 115-1 16. 
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putes committee) is also denied jurisdiction to bind parties in respect of 
non-industrial matters during the currency of an award.25 
By virtue of this embargo either party to the industrial relationship can, 
with impunity, seek refuge under the Act and claim immunity from the 
other's demands. Although issues arising within the general spectrum of 
employment relations may be of pressing concern to a particular party, 
they cannot be pursued if beyond the statutory definition of "d i~pu te" .~~  
Courts in the exercise of their functions have held fast to the definition in 
insisting that the character of a demand is unaffected by and, for determin- 
ing whether there exists a "dispute", assessed independently of industrial 
action taken in support of the demand.27 Indeed the jurisdictional concept 
of "dispute" is a double-edged constraint in this regard-for what freedom 
may remain to go outside the Act to force agreement on matters beyond 
the Act's jurisdictional limits, the Commerce Amendment Act 1976 
excludes by creating the offence to strike or lockout "concerning a matter 
[wlhich is not an industrial matter".28 
Thus, an Arbitration Court ruling that a demand is "non-industrial" 
preserves only the legal freedom to negotiate informally outside the Act via 
request without coercion. This is not to imply that informal "house agree- 
ments" on contentious matters are never reached in this way.2Q But in the 
absence of bargaining power, how often will a reluctant party concede to, or 
even consider, the other's request? Also, in the event of a party's refusal to 
consider the other's demand how realistic is it to insist the latter simply 
accept that refusal-and invoke none of the forms of direct industrial action 
traditional to the management-union relationship-on the strength of an 
external ruling of the Arbitration Court that a matter is "non-ind~strial"?~~ 
Observe the leading case on industrial matters in New Zealand, discussed 
p re~en t ly .~~  No sooner had the Industrial Court ruled the ANZ Bank's staff- 
mHence the decision in the ANZ Bank case, supra, note 7 (discussed infra).  For 
analysis of this decision, see P. A. Joseph, The Judicial Perspective o f  Industrial 
Conciliation and Arbitration in New Zealand, Legal Research Foundation Publica- 
tion No. 17, 1980, examining generally the Act's jurisdictional requirement. 
See the ANZ Bank case, ibid. 
"Australian Federation of Air Pilots v Flight Crew Officers Industrial Tribunal 
(1969-70) 119 C.L.R. 16, at 39 per Taylor J. See also Cromwell and Bannock- 
burn Colliery C o  Ltd v Otago Board of Conciliation (1906) 25 N.Z.L.R. 986, per 
Cooper J. 
"Section 119B; by virtue of s. 119A the term "industrial matter" having the meaning 
assigned by s. 2 of the Industrial Relations Act 1973. The s. 119B offence is notable 
in that, in addition to imposing criminal liability, the section also imposes civil 
liability at the suit of any person suffering loss or damage "as if the strike or lock- 
out were a tort independently of this section"; s. 119B(3). 
'$E.g., see the New Zealand Oil Industry Redundancy agreement (operative as from 
2 December 1980 for a period of 12 months certain, and thereafter subject to either 
party wishing to review the agreement), containing relocation, retraining and re- 
dundancy compensation clauses applying in the event of new computer technologies 
affecting workers by status or loss of job. See also the agreement dated 10 April 
1981 between the Hawkes Bay Farmers' Meat Co and the N.Z. Freezing and 
Related Industries Clerical Officers' I.U.W., noted Mazengarb's Industrial Law 
Bulletin, Vol. 1 Issue No. 1, July 1981, at 9-10. 
"Cf., Commerce Amendment Act 1976, s. 119B, supra. 
" ANZ Bank case, supra, note 7. 
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loan policy to be non-negotiable by the union than strike action secured the 
compromise which that ruling precluded through the formal disputes pro- 
cedure. 
As a matter of practicality and law, therefore, one would expect the 
judicial constr~~ction f industrial matters to embrace all bargaining subjects 
common to employment relations (no less, subjects peculiar to particular 
employment relations). If the object of the legislation is to institutionalise 
-not outlaw-industrial conflict, then there is much to be said for one early 
New Zealand judge who refused to limit the legislation: " 'Industrial 
matters' as defined", Stout C.J. said, "include every kind of dispute that can 
arise between an employer and his workmen".32 Yet this is not the bench- 
mark courts have adopted. 
(b) The ANZ Bank case 
The Arbitration Court in the Law Practitioners case offered no analysis 
of the term "industrial matters" other than to observe: 
. . . the scope of the section is well discussed in N e w  Zetrland Bank Officers I.U.W. 
v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited, I.C. 71 o i  1977, a decision 
of the Industrial Court delivered by Jamieson J .  In that case, although the Pactr!al 
issue was quite different, there is a full discussion of the phrase 'industrial matter' 
and we set out hereunder some lengthy quotations from that decision.33 
The ANZ Bank decision and the authorities on which it is based have 
been examined elsewhere.34 However the criticism of the reasoning in that 
case35 is worth repeating for it applies equally to the Arbitration Court's 
ruling on the technology question. In the Industrial Court Jamieson J. 
observed the similarities of language between the equivalent Australian and 
New Zealand statutes, determined that the Australian cases are "of strong 
persuasive authority" in New Zealand, and resolved "[wle may start with 
Clancy's case". In fact it is by reason of this eager acceptance of Clancy's 
case that Jamieson J.'s decision has been severely criticised: if one 
examines the many subsequent Australian a u t h o r i t i e ~ ~ ~  it is seen that these 
simple reiterate the construction upon which the judges in this early case 
seized. 
Clancy was a 1904 decision of the High Court of Australia holding that 
the regulation of shop trading hours of butchers' shops did not so proxi- 
mately affect the employment relationship as to qualify as an industrial 
matter.37 The Court focussed on the first limb of the definition pertaining 
to "work done or to be done by workers".38 According to the High Court, 
'ZTaylor  and Oakley v M r  Justice Edwards (1900) 18 N.Z.L.R. 876 (C.A.), at 885. 
S3 Transcript, at 4. 
"P. A. Joseph, suprcl, note 25. For further analysis of the authorities, see I. Hughes, 
Redundancy and the Law in N e w  Zealand (1980) 9 N.Z.U.L.R. 122, at 125- 134 
and 138-142. 
'Voseph, ibid. 
36Listed by Jamieson J. in the A N Z  Bank case, supra, note 7 (cited ironically by 
counsel for the Bank Officers' union); afid see generally the cases discussed in the 
articles, supra, note 31. 
"But see the Shops and Offices Act 1955, s. 3, deeming the question of shop-trading 
hours in New Zealand to be an industrial matter for purposes of the Industrial 
Relations Act 1973. See now Shop Trading Hours Act 1977. 
Industrial Relations Act 1973, s. 2. 
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this must be construed to mean "work actually done by the employee or 
actually provided by the employer to be done, that is, as he thinks fit to 
provide, but that they do not in any way refer to the quantity of work 
which the employer is to provide. . . . they [the words in question] have 
nothing to do with prescribing what work shall be provided by an 
employer".39 In this construction, Griffiths C.J. emphasises the word 
"actually". But: 
. . . unfortunately the word does not appear in the statute. Nor is there any statu- 
tory direction that 'work done or to be done' means work actually provided by the 
employer 'as he thinks fit to provide'. No doubt a worker engaged solely on piece 
rates would be surprised to learn that industrial matters has 'nothing to do with 
prescribing what work (if any, according to the same judge) shall be prcvided 
by the employer'.ro 
Was not the concession Griffiths C.J. made inevitable, therefore? 
. . . there is a visible difference between this constrilction and the words of the 
section. The point did not pass unnoticed. The Chief Justice conceded that 'in 
one sense', though without explaining in which sense, the regulation of shop 
trading hours did fall within the definition. The extent of the explanation offered 
was that '[elvidently some limitation of the meaning [of industrial matters] is 
necessary'.41 
However, whatever the viability of the High Court's construction upon 
this first limb the answer it gives to the technology question is clear. If 
industrial matters have nothing to do with "the quantity of work which the 
employer is to provide", or indeed with "what work shall be pr~vided",~" 
then they have nothing to do with the introduction of computer technology 
affecting both the type and quantity of work the employer provides. It was 
as though to clarify this that the second judge in Clancy, O'Connor J., 
instanced the railway's automatic fuel feeder, the introduction of which his 
Honour said "would very largely affect the amount of work to be done by 
 employee^".^^ Yet "[c]ouM it be contended for one moment that there was 
jurisdiction in the Arbitration Court to prohibit the use of such apparatus 
on the ground that it affected the work to be done . . .", his Honour asked, 
"or that it had power to direct what kinds of machinery should be 
used . . . ?".44 
Significantly, O'Connor J. was not contending that the introduction of 
this labour-saving device woul'd not affect the work to be done, which is all 
the definition requires, but rather that it would only indirectly do In 
''Supra, note 9, at 202-203 per Griffiths C.J. (emphasis added). 
40 Joseph, supra, note 25, at 14. 
" Zbid., quoting Griffiths C.J., supra, note 9 at  202. 
Per Griffiths C.J., corresponding to note 39. 
" Supra, note 9, at 206. 
Ibid., at 206-207. 
Y See also R v Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commissioner ex parte 
Melbourne and Metropolitan Tramways Board (1966) 115 C.L.R. 443, at 450 per 
Barwick C.J. : "Demands which in themselves do not directly involve the [employer- 
employee] relationship will not be industrial in the relevant sense, however much 
the relationship . . . may be indirectly affected by the result of acceptance or 
refusal of the demand." For comment, see Joseph, supra, note 25, at 30-32. 
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explanation, his Honour pointed to the need to judicially curtail the Act: 
"[Olnce we begin to introduce and include in . . . [industrial matters] 
matters indirectly affecting work in the industry, it becomes very difficult 
to draw any line so as to prevent the power of the Arbitration Court from 
being extended to the regulation and control of businesses and industries 
in every part".46 Even on the basis of O'Connor J.'s example, however, 
the distinction (between matters directly and indirectly affecting work to 
be done) does not withstand analysis. Simply, how could the introduction 
of the automatic fuel feeder, which on O'Connor J.'s admission "would 
very largely affect the amount of work to be done",47 be categorised as only 
indirectly affecting work done or to be done? Bearing in mind that the 
adverbs underlying O'Connor J.'s distinction are separated in meaning by 
degree only, this is tantamount to saying that the introduction of this device 
would very largely, only indirectly affect the work to be done; or, to 
reverse matters, that an employer decision directly, but scarcely, affecting 
the work process qualifies as an industrial matter. 
In the Law Practitioners case, the Arbitration Court approved two further 
statements48 which Jamieson J. quoted from Clancy. First: 
The words 'priviieges, rights or duties of employers or employees in any  industry,' 
clearly refer to matters of mutual obligation. They imply ex vi termini that there are 
two parties, one of whom owe a duty or possesses a right as against the other.49 
This statement pertains to the second limb of the definition but which, 
in this dictum, is construed to exercise effectively the word "privileges" from 
the section. The limitation this imposes is illustrated by the ANZ Bank 
case in which employees' privileges were unilaterally withdrawn without, it 
was held, creating a "dispute". The Bank Employees' Union sought to 
invoke the disputes procedure in its award to negotiate the Bank's proposal 
to alter its policy of providing low-interest staff loans. Clearly this was a 
proposal "affecting or relating to . . . privileges . . . of workers" in the bank- 
ing industry in the employ of this particular Bank, but because "[tlhe 
award contains nothing to create any rights or duties in relation to the 
availability of staff loans" there was held to be no "dispute" by which to 
invoke the dispute of rights procedure.50 
A decision that technological change in the workplace is of the same 
status as the Bank's staff loan policy requires more, however, then just 
confining this second limb to rights and duties strict0 sensu: it necessitates 
either a refusal to recognise the inclusion of this limb or that it be further 
confined to include only those rights and duties which the first limb words 
"work done or to be done" contemplate. This is discussed below. 
The second statement approved from Clancy, consistently with other 
judicial dicta of the period, epitomises why courts at the turn of the century 
sought to limit the legislation for the express purpose of preserving employer 
* Supra, note 9, at  207. 
" Ibid., at 206. 
*At 271. 
*9 (1904) 1 C.L.R. 181, at 201 per Griffiths C.J. 
ANZ case, supra note 7, per Jamieson J. 
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freedoms. As the argument to exclude the early case-law on this basis has 
been fully explored elsewhere, the following is but a reference to it.'' 
In Clancy, Griffiths C.J. cautioned: 
In construing the [Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration] Act it should be borne 
in mind that it is an Act in restriction of the common law rights of the subject, 
and . . . it is a reason why the meaning should not be strained as against the liberty 
of the subject.52 
The "subject" was, of course, the employer who, until the introduction 
of industrial conciliation and arbitration, enjoyed unmitigated freedom of 
contract in employment relations. The mechanics of the market theory of 
the period reveal why it was imperative for the commercial courts to legally 
guarantee that freedom,53 even if it meant disavowing in part the statutory 
language of industrial conciliation and arbitration. 
"Competition is the life of trade", one judge of the period remarked, "I 
can see no limit to cornpetiti~n."~~ This was not simply a formula for 
economic efficiency, but rather the grundnorm of a political economy. It 
converted courts to the belief that "[all1 the law has to do . . . is secure a 
fair field for the unrestricted exercise of industrial enterpri~e".~~ Assuming 
many traders in competition, each so small that individual traders responded 
only to movements in price determined by supply and demand: 
. . . price flexibility was the best guarantee that the community's resources would 
be put to their most socially desired uses. In the ideally functioning economy 
which the model implied, movement in price monitored a movement of resources 
to and from economic sectors that served the consumers' wants. To ensure the 
proper functioning of the model it was essential, therefore, for there to be perfect 
resource mobility. It was essential, therefore, for the employer, the owner or 
organiser of productive capital, to be free from any restriction individually or 
collectively imposed by labour on his entrepreneurial activity.56 
The employment contract defining the incidents of service was developed 
in this light, as a period response that would tolerate no impediment to the 
free functioning of the market. Indeed, as Selznick observes "[a] truly 
contractual theory of employment did not emerge until the concept of a 
"See P. A. Joseph, Management's Labour Relations Prerogatives and the Unpro- 
ductive Debate: Still the Classical Economics and the Entrepreneur's Lot (1979) 
14 U.B.C. Law Review 75. 
"Supra, note 49. See also Australian Tramway Employees' Association v Prahran 
and Melvern Tramway Trust (1913) 17 C.L.R. 680 (H.C.A.), at 687 per Barton 
A.C.J.: "[Tlhe common law rights of citizens are to be regarded as unhampered 
except so far as a Statute diminishes them expressly or by necessary implication. 
Certain rights then remain with an employer. He may. .  .carry on his business in 
such. .  .manner as seems best to him, and he may decline to give employment 
except on such conditions as he thinks conducive to the success of his enterprise." 
"See Joseph, supra, note 51, at 85-95. 
"Mogul Steamship Co v McGregor Gow & Co [I8921 AC 25 (HL), at 50-51 per 
Lord hlorris. 
'Quoting from the Ninth Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the 
Organisation and Rules of Trade Unions (1869) (UK), para. 64. 
" Joseph, supra, note 51, at 132-1 33. 
free market gained ascendance in economic life".57 But to ensure a relation- 
ship of command and servility, the theory could not afford to be consistent 
-the contractual imperative for a free labour market (effected principally 
by developing the common law concept of wrongful dismissals8) did not 
prevent courts adapting the notion of sovereign authority from earlier 
master-servant law: 
Though labour too was a resource commending mobility, it was not the resource 
by which society measured its wealth. The employer, as entrepreneur, was the 
figure to whom the common law responded. He was the instrument of resource 
reallocation: it was his property, and his use of it, that would prevent 'a waste'.59 
Historically, what is most peculiar about industrial conciliation and arbi- 
tration is that it was conceived amid this thinking, yet was anathema to it. 
As a system of state regulation of labour disputes, it threatened to sup- 
plant the e~nployer's common law-contractual-rights to conduct his 
business free from the restrictions labour sought to impose. These indeed 
were the "common law rights" of which Griffiths C.J. spoke,60 and which 
the early courts sought to preserve against the state's intrusion. 
But do they still warrant the restriction these courts imposed on the 
legislation? Consider what has happened since the first conciliation and 
arbitration statute, not least the complete transformation of the market that 
commended the theory to which courts in Cluncy's time responded. Observe 
the intensifying concentration of post-war industry. In 1976 the markets of 
nearly one third of all New Zealand industries were dominated by the three 
largest enterprises in each market, these enterprises aggregating between 
67-100 percent of the total output/sales in each of these markek61 (Ironic- 
ally, the high capital requirements of post-war technology is identified as a 
principal cause of the concentration of capital accompanying this degree of 
market power.62) It  suffices to add that this does not compare with the 
notion of many small traders in competition, ensuring the efficient allocation 
of the community's resources exclusively in response to market price fixed 
by supply and demand. 
(c) Technology and "industrial mdters" 
The importance of the ANZ Bank decision for New Zealand's industrial 
" P. Selznick, Law, Society and industrial Justice (1969), at 130-1 31.  
Extending a limited right to damages but excluding the remedy of specific perform- 
ance; see respectively Addis v Gramophone C o  [I9091 AC 488 (H.L.) and New 
Zealand Dairy Factories and Related Trades Employees' ZUW v New Zealand 
Co-operative Dairy C o  119591 N.Z.L.R. 910. Selznick, ibid., at 135 comments "the 
main economic significance [of this concept] was the contribution it made to easy 
layoff of employees in response to business fluctuations". See further, Joseph, 
supra, note 51, at 89-94. 
" Joseph, ibid., at 132-133. 
See the dicta quoted, supra, text corresponding to and in note 52. 
"See J. Ellis, Industrial Concentration, Research Paper No. 20, N.Z. Institute of 
Economic Research (1976). For further empirical evidence of the extent of separ- 
ation of ownership and control in New Zealand companies, see G. Fogelberg, 
Changing Patterns of  Shareownership in New Zealand's Largest Companies, 
Research Paper No. 15, Dept. of Business Administration, Victoria University of 
Wellington (1978). For discussion, see Joseph, supra, note 51, at 122-126. 
"See Shonfield, supra, note 10, at 373-74. 
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system this decade cannot be under-estimated. Never in New Zealand had 
the question of industrial matters been fully explored, and one might specu- 
late that but for this decision the Australian authorities commencing with 
Clancy might never have achieved proininence in a New Zealand court; 
apart from one 1951 Court of Appeal decision,63 only in the early cases 
dealing with the preferential employment question had the definition been 
judicially con~ ide red .~~  
What cannot now be doubted, however, as a result of the ANZ Bank 
decision, is that there is in New Zealand a sui generis body of matters 
deemed "industrial" beyond which unions cannot formally negotiate. Only 
by reference to the early decisions drawing on contractual and master- 
servant analogies can today's courts distinguish these from, in particular, 
"managerial" matters. The Australian courts are adamant, to quote Barwick 
C.J.: "Whilst it is a truism that both industrial disputes and awards made in 
their settlement may consequentially have an impact upon the management 
of an enterprise and upon otherwise unfettered managerial decisions, the 
management of the enterprise is not itself a subject-matter of a industrial 
dispute."65 
It was on this basis that the Clerical and Office Staff Employees7 attempt 
to secure the right to consultation prior to managerial decision to install 
word processing machines failed, as being managerial and not industrial in 
character. Yet wherein lies the statutory justification for this decision? Thz 
first limb of the definition of industrial matters embraces "all matters 
affecting or relating to work done or to be done by The instal- 
lation of word processing machines not only affects or relates to "work 
done or to be done", it clearly changes it both as to the nature and quantity 
of work provided or to be provided pursuant to the employees7 contracts of 
service.67 Consider also the second limb of the definition, embracing "all 
matters affecting or relating to . . . the privileges, rights, and duties of 
employers or workers in any industry". If the introduction of technology 
enables the employer to reduce his labour force, does not the decision to 
install it affect the rights of workers? A decision to introduce, for example, 
word processing machines is a decision inter alia to create red~ndancies"~ 
which is a decision to terminate the existing right to employment secured 
by the employees' contracts of service; whether the reason for termination 
be justifiable or otherwiseag the definition unambiguously speaks of matters 
'U Wilson and Horton Ltd v Hurle (Inspector o f  Awards) [I9511 N.Z.L.R. 368, up- 
holding an award clause requiring payment for travelling time but without referring 
to the Australian authorities. 
"See Taylor and Oakley v Mr Justice Edwards (1900) 18 N.Z.L.R. 876 (C.A.); 
Magnor v Gohns [I9161 N.Z.L.R. 529 (C.A.) ; Butt v Frazer (Judge of the Court o f  
Arbitration) [I9291 N.Z.L.R. 636 (Full Ct of the S .  C t . ) ;  Federated Seamen's 
Union v Sanford Ltd [I9301 N.Z.L.R. 460 (C.A.); Wood  v Thomson and the N.Z. 
Seamen's Union 119721 N.Z.L.R. 53 (C.A. ) .  
c6 R v Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commissioner, ex parte Mel- 
bourne and Metropolitan Tramways Board (1966) 115 C.L.R. 443, at 451. 
-Industrial Relations Act 1973, s. 2 (quoted in full supra).  
" See Part 11, infra. 
" Ibid. 
Cf., Industrial Relations Act 1973, s. 117. 
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affecting the rights of workers, and the Arbitration Court has always 
insisted that workers within its principal jurisdiction are distinguished by 
their engagement under such a contract.70 
Indeed, 'does not the second limb speak also of the privileges and rights 
of employers? This embraces the notion of managerial prerogative itself, 
managerial prerogatives being either privileges or rights employers enjoy. 
By the same fact a management-union difference over the exercise of an 
assumed managerial prerogative is a difference in relation to an industrial 
matter which, by virtue of the compulsory bargaining procedures of con- 
ciliation and arbitration, extinguishes the unilateral right of decision that 
managerial prerogative implies. Viewed thus, the statutory definition 
excludes the very distinction (between "managerial" and "industrial" mat- 
ters) which the ANZ Bank case incorporated from the Australian decisions 
and on which the Arbitration Court relied to uphold the employer's uni- 
lateral right of decision to introduce computer technology. 
PART I1 
(a) The immediate impact of the decision 
Various word processing systems are available in New Zealand." 
Broadly, word processors are electronic systems which prepare, edit, store 
and retrieve text, either as a "stand alone" device (in which the entire 
system is contained in one desk-sized unit), or as part of a "shared logic" 
system (in which several units share a wider storage and processing facility). 
The potential of the machine in terms of production and reduced over- 
heads has led to it being described as "the saviour of the New Zealand 
legal practice".72 The machine has also been viewed as "a major threat to 
office employment levels which threatens to . . . deskill . . . dehumanise and 
reduce the career prospects for typists".73 
In the LQW Practitioners' case the union's original claim in conciliation 
was : 
(a) Where the employer is contemplating the introduction of new computer 
technology including word processing machines, the employer shall have full 
discussions and consultations with the delegate and union concerned prior to 
such decisions being made. 
(b) Where any dispute arises in relation to this clause and cannot be disposed of 
by the employers' and workers' representatives the provisions of [the dispute 
of rights procedure] shall apply.74 
loE.g., see McMullin Holdiizgs Ltd v Auckland Clerical Workers' I.U.W. [I9691 
N.Z.L.R. 530 (Ct. Arb.). Cf., Part X of the Industrial Relations Act 1973. 
"See generally D. Orme, 'Word processing for Law Firms", (1979) NZLJ 211 and 
"Word Processing-Coping with Changes in Technology in Your Firm" (1979) 
NZLJ 243. 
"In an article of that title by B. D. Thomas (1980) NZLJ 302. 
"Combined Unions National Servicing Office, "Report Back of the Inter-Union 
Working Party on New Technology" unpublished paper, September 1979, para. 
1 (el .  
"At 268. 
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The clause ultimately fixed by the Court (Sir Leonard Hadley dissenting) 
read : 
(a) When an employer is considering the introduction of new computer technology 
(including word processing machines) the employees likely to be affected by 
any decision arising therefrom will be 'first advised. 
(b) When an employer has decided to introduce such technology the employer 
concerned shall consult fully with the employees affected and the representa- 
tive of the union. 
(c) When the introduction of such technology will result in redundancies, the 
employer concerned shall notify the union to enable discussions on redund- 
ancy to take place. Such notification shall be in accordance with [the redund- 
ancy] . . . clause of this award. 
(d) The award has been issued accordingly including the Memorandum as set out 
above.75 
The significant difference between the claim and the eventual clause lay 
in the latter's absence of any reference to resolution through the disputes 
procedure in the award. Thus, once the employer has fulfilled his or her 
obligation to consult, "the matter is at an end".76 
The written submissions to the Court concentrated principally on techno- 
logical and economic matters.77 However, the Court's decision that the 
installation of word processors was not an "industrial matter" and could 
not give rise to a dispute under the Industrial Relations Act was purely 
legal and based upon the analysis of "industrial matters" set out in the 
ANZ Bank case, which was cited at length in the judgement of Horn C.J. 
In particular his Honour stressed that the Act "does not commit . . . 
authority to regulate generally the manner in which the industry shall bz 
carried on".78 The decision to install new machinery was "a decision for 
the e m p l ~ y e r " . ~ ~  
At the heart of the dispute lay the question of control over work, "the 
central issue in industrial  relation^".^^ The written submissions of the Union 
concentrated on a demand for "the maximum amount of consultation with 
unions and workers"81 before the installation of new computer technology 
and denied that this amounted to an attempt to control the introduction of 
t echn~ logy .~~  The New Zealand Employers' Federation (NZEF) argued 
that "the aim is 'participation' which in turns implies '~ont ro l ' . "~~ The 
"New Zealand (excluding Northern and Taranaki Industrial Districts) Law Prac- 
titioners' Award, Arbitration Court of New Zealand, Document 586. 
'' Dissenting Opinion of Sir Leonard Hadley, ibid. 
"We are obliged to Mr Paul Duignan, research worker with the Federation of 
Labour, for full copies of the written submissions in the case. 
'Titing Cocks' case. 
"At 273. 
" J. Purcell and R. Smith, "The Control of Work", London, 1979 page 1. 
" Submissions, page 20. 
" Ibid., p.2. 
'' Submissiotzs, page 3. 
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argument is not new to industrial relations in New Zealand.84 For present 
purposes the legal significance of control is twofold. First the presence of 
control is an important element in identifying the contract of employment 
(the legal relationship upon which much of the Act is basedLs5 although 
the emphasis has shifted from actual controls6 to a right of control in peri- 
pheral aspects of work." Here it has been argued that the esrence of tlte 
control test is to be found in the terms of the contract88 which in this con- 
text incorporate the provisions of the relevant award by virtue of section 
231 of the Act. Since all awards severely curtail the employer's right of 
control (or managerial prerogative) by virtue, inter alia, of containing the 
section 117 personal grievance procedure, it would appear that recognition 
of the claim in the Law Practitioners' case would present no conceptual 
difficulties in purely contractual terms. Nevertheless the same issue of mana- 
gerial prerogative is relevant to the second legal issue raised, whether the 
question was an "industrial matter" and thus capable of resolution by a 
disputes committee. Here the Court accepted the argument of the N.Z.E.F., 
Horn C.J. stating that "provision for reference to a disputes committee and 
ultimately a reference to this Court, could be used as a matter of control"89 
which took the claim beyond the boundaries of "industrial matters". It 
might be argued that "control" from one side or another is never absent 
from the legal relationship of employer and worker and that the primary 
purpose of the disputes procedures under the Act is to regulate negotiation 
concerning such matters. Further, that the post-installation dispute as to the 
consequences of introduction, which the Court seemingly contemplated, 
might have the same effect of "controlling" technology in practice.g0 How- 
ever, the following discussion will be restricted to the immediate implica- 
tions of the Court's decision for the law on industrial negotiation contained 
in the Industrial Relations Act 1973. As noted above the Court "does not 
regard itself as bound by any factual precedent in matters of arbitration". 
Recognising that "different approaches may need to be adopted for other 
industries as further technological changes occur"g1 Horn C.J. referred to 
" 'industrial matters' as at present unde r s t~od . "~~  Yet there is nothing to 
suggest that any radical revision in the Court's view of its jurisdiction will 
occur in the near future. 
"It  lies at the heart of discussions on "industrial democracy". See New Zealand 
En~ployers' Federation "Employee Involvement", Wellington 1977, D. Smith, "The 
Employers' Federation Declares its Hand" (1978) 28 Lab. and Emp. Gazette, No. 
2,  p.71 and R. G. Trott "Worker Participation-A Trade Union Vicwpoint", (1978) 
28 Lab. and Emp. Gazette, No. 3, p.21. 
" See the definition of "worker" in s. 2 of the Act. 
'"ee Eramwell L.J. in Ye1:ens v Noakes (1880) 6 Q.B.D. 530 at p.532. 
"'See Zliijs v Wirth Bros, P l y .  Ltd (1955) C.L.R. 561 at pp.570-571. Though not 
without criticism: C. P. Mills, "Defining the Contract of Employment" (1979) 
Australian Business Law Review 229 at pp.239-241. 
" Millslls, ibid., page 245. 
"At  271. 
'"ee further J. Haghes. oi>.cit. n.34 
'l At 267. 
"At  273. 
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(b) Implications for informal bargaining 
Before considering the long-term implications of the Law Practitioners' 
case for bargaining within the framework of the Act, one wider implication 
is worth noting. Commenting on a submission that the Minister of Labour 
had indicated that the new technology was an apt subject for bargaining, 
Horn C. J. remarked that: 
We do not suggest, by any means in this decision. that we wish to impose or 
suggest that there should be any constraint on full negotiation and bargaining 
between unions of workers and unions of employers as well as between individual 
employers and unions on questions of technological changes in industry whether 
general or particular.93 
With respect it is difficult to reconcile this statement with the effect 
which the decision seems likely to have-precluding bargaining within the 
formal industrial conciliation and arbitration system on the introduction 
of technology. Not only will the decision seemingly affect future disputes 
of interest in this way but also the renegotiation of those awards currently 
containing clauses which contemplate the use of the dispute of rights pro- 
cedure on the issue of installation. Such clauses fall into two broad classes. 
First, a clause aimed primarily at protecting the individual worker from 
the consequences of the technology, by precluding alteration of workers' 
positions until the change in work methods has been ~d i sc~ssed .~~econd ly ,  
a clause aimed more broadly at joint investigation of the technology itself, 
for example: 
Where in any establishment there is likely to occur or appears likely to occur a 
displacement of a worker or workers due to the advent of automated methods of 
manufacture, the question shall be jointly investigated by representatives of the 
workers' and employers' organisation as they may arrange. Failing agreement the 
matter shall be dealt with [under the disputes of rights procedure in the award]. 
Attention is drawn to the provisions . . . for the settlement of Personal Griev- 
ances.95 
The resolution of such disputes now appears to be a matter beyond the 
jurisdiction of the relevant committee or of the Arbitration Court.g8 Thus 
it may be predicted that one effect of the Law Practitioners' decision will 
encourage the growth of "informal" bargaining outside the ambit of the 
Industrial Relations Act. Indeed, it may be that Horn C.J. was referring 
to such bargaining in commenting on the submission above. Little recent 
research is available on the extent to which unions and employers negotiate 
sS At 272. 
"A fairly common clause in airline awards. See C1. 13 of the Air New Zealand 
Limited, Safe Air Limited Aerial Employers' Award (1979) Book of Awards 4077 
and C1. 17 of the Societe Internationale de Telecommunications Aeronautiques 
Societe Co-operative Clerical Employees Voluntary Collective Agreement (1979) 
Book of Awards 8757. 
"Cl. 23(A) of the W & R Fletcher (New Zealand) Limited Mataura Employees 
Voluntary Collective Agreement (1979) Book of Awards 4629. See also C1.22(a) 
of the New Zealand Dairy Factories Employees Award (1979) Book of Awards 
10927. 
wSee generally New Zealand Waterside Workers' Federation I.A.W. v Frazer [I9741 
NZLR 689, at page 710 per Salmond J. 
138 Canterbury Law Review [Vol. 1, 19811 
outside the formal systems7 but informal or unregistered house agreements 
are common. Machinery similar to that employed in negotiating voluntary 
collective agreements under the Act could be utilised without difficulty and 
without eventual submission of the agreement to the Court. Those factors 
which lead to the popularity of voluntary collective agreements--ease of 
administration, negotiating advantages and "individualisation" of issuesQ8-- 
apply equally to informal bargaining. It has recently been held that an 
unregistered industrial agreement between a union and an employer is not 
a contract enforceable by an individual employee, albeit a member of the 
union.99 
(c) What negotiable issues are left within the formal framework? 
(i) Eflects of instaIlation on working conditions 
The National Computer Centre (U.K.) has identified eight stages in the 
introduction of micro-electronic technology into the workplace: 
1. Before microprocessors are considered 
2. Initial study 
3. Feasibility study 
4. Systems analysis and outline design 
5. Systems design, programming and implementation planning 
6. Installation, testing and implementation 
7. Day to day running 
8.  Review and continuing deve1opment.l 
To adopt the terminology of industrial negotiation, the introduction of 
micro-processors is a "perishable issue" in that, once the decision is taken 
to introduce the equipment, the range of negotiable items diminishes. As 
progress is made through stages one to eight the negotiable issues will 
narrow, making it difficult to reverse decisions taken at the previous stages 
and leaving little opportunity to bargain on what are considered to be 
objectionable features of the technology: "[once] a system has been 
designed, changes are difficult to effect and important features of job con- 
tent and promotional opportunities are set".2 In holding that "the intro- 
duction of any new machinery or method into a workplace is a decision for 
"See D. F. Smith and D. J. Turkington, "A Profile of Voluntary Collective Bar- 
gaining in New Zealand, Wellington, 1981. For an earlier paper see M. A. Wilson, 
"Collective Bargaining in New Zealand Outside the Industrial Conciliation and 
Arbitration Act", (1970), Auckland University Law Review, 37. 
"See "The Role of Voluntary Collective Agreements", Labour and Employment 
Gazette, Vol. 31, No. 1, March 1981, 36. 
Re Andrew M .  Patterson Ltd, unreported, High Court, Auckland 7 December 
1981, M. No. 1080/80, Prichard I. 
* H. Farrow, "Computerisation Guidelines", Manchester, 1979, pp.21-27 (cited by 
A. Francis, and P. Willman, "Microprocessors: Impact and Response", Personnel 
Review Vol. 9, No. 2, p.9). 
F ranc is  and Willman, op.cit., at p.15 who point out nevertheless that microproces- 
sors can be reprogrammed at relatively low cost. 
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the employern3 the Arbitration Court has clearly established that stages one 
to five of the introductory table are beyond the formal boundaries of 
negotiation under the Act and outside the jurisdiction of the Court itself. 
The Court accepted nevertheless that 
the consequences to employees resulting from such a decision may well be indus- 
trial matters. Methods of operating, even methods of installation, where they affect 
working or operating conditions may be within the scope of 'industrial matters' 
and could be covered by award provisions including disputes procedures. 
Also that ". . . [a] retraining scheme in preparation for redundancy, . . . 
might be the subject of a claim relating to an industrial matter if the 
retraining takes place whilst the relationship (i.e. employer and employee) 
enure~" .~  Nevertheless, by effectively excluding the possibility of formal 
negotiation at the stage of, say, feasibility study and systems design, the 
Court has reduced the practical effect of such a "residual" right to chal- 
lenge consequences insofar as working or operating conditions are con- 
cerned. The negotiations which take place will concern options which have 
hardened simply by virtue of the equipment having been installed. 
In examining the consequences of the introduction of micro-electronic 
technology, union negotiators confront the same dilemma as that raised by 
redundancy generally: the union is faced with a threat the inevitability of 
which it may not be willing to concede, yet it must ensure that its members 
are protected if the threat is rea l i~ed .~  In the Law Practitioners' case the 
dilemma was reflected in the union's attack upon the technology for its 
effect upon working conditions taken with its claim that the introduction of 
the equipment represented "an undeniable progression which should be 
recognised in the rate of pay for word processor  operator^".^ The threat to 
working conditions allegedly posed by word processors falls into three 
main categories: danger to health, loss of work skills and reduced job 
satisfaction (the same adverse consequences allegedly ensuing from other 
micro-electronic technology). Whilst the Arbitration Court recognised that 
some consequences of the installation of word processors would be industrial 
matters the Court did not deal with such consequences in detail. However 
there is clear authority that dangerous aspects of working conditions fall 
within the scope of industrial matters and are open to negotiation and 
eventual arbi trat i~n.~ Thus claims that word processors are unacceptably 
'At 273, quoting the supplement to Vol. 1 of D. L. Mathieson, "Industrial Law 
in New Zealand", Wellington, 1970, at p.73. 
'The adage that on being told to unite with nothing to lose but their chains the 
response of many New Zealand unions would be to negotiate a chain allowance, 
may arise from such a dilemma. 
Page 9 of the applicants' submissions. 
Australian Federation of Air Pilots v Flight Crew Officers Industrial Tribunal 42 
A.L.J.R. 44. 
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noisy and "cause eye strain . . . posture problems [and] pose a radiation 
hazard" may legitimately give rise to a dispute under the Act8 
It is arguable that the effect of word processors upon work skills and 
job satisfaction also falls within the definition of the "industrial matter." 
One criticism of the new technology is that its capacity to monitor indi- 
vidual workers' productivity may lead to occupational stresss For example, 
the Universal Product Coding system (UPC) imprints codes on products 
which are read by a Point of Sale terminal (POS), a computerised scan- 
ner at the check-out counter, obviating the need for individual pricing. The 
POS monitors work performance by keeping a check on the speed of trans- 
actions which the operator carries out.1° Similarly many word processors 
can be programmed to issue instructions and even 'disciplinary warnings if 
input speeds or time at the machine do not meet the employers' targets." 
Thus the technology may be used both to increase the pace of work and 
to monitor the response of individual workers to that increased pace. 
Where the Court can be persuaded that such a system results in occupa- 
tional stress that adversely affects the health of workers, no jurisdictional 
problem should arise. Even where the change does not have such an effect 
the role of the contractual relationship in defining industrial matters should 
resolve any dispute as to jurisdiction since, in contractual terms, the altered 
conditions of work could be regarded as an attempt at unilateral variation 
of terms. The contractual analysis here has been said to provide "the 
description in legal terms of the balance between managerial prerogative 
and the rights of employees in relation to the terms on which they work"12 
and is thus particularly appropriate to the present issue. Nevertheless, recog- 
nition of the problem as an industrial matter is of little value without an 
adequate remedy and the question then arises: What remedy is available 
in these circumstances? The obvious answer is an award clause limiting the 
use of the relevant technology by excluding certain applications of it. For 
example, one current award dealing with efficiency speed for typographers 
states that "[slpeed shall not be held to constitute the sole basis of effici- 
ency" and that "computer produced statistical data relating to ouput shall 
not be the sole basis for determining the efficiency of any  pera at or".'^ 
' S. Macdonald and T. Mandeville, "Word Processors and Employment", Jo. of Ind. 
Rel., vol. 22 no. 2, June 1980, p.137 at p.145. Similar criticisms are made of Visual 
Display Units (VDUs), a form of automated records management involving com- 
puterised records and microfilmed documents which are recalled from a data bank 
on the VDU (and which are a feature of some word processors). The Department 
of Health found no evidence to support allegations of radiation hazards from VDUs 
but did concede eyesight and posture problems, largely arising from misuse of the 
equipment ("Visual Display Units" Report ref. W/1/80). 
'L. Coutts, "Work processors take a toll of those who use them", Modern Office 
and Data Management, 31 October 1979, p.3. 
'OM. Varnham, "When the Chips are Down", Ind. Rel. Review, Vol. 1, No. 4, 
November-December 1979, page 17 at p.22. See generally R. D. Lansbury, "New 
Technology and Industrial Relations in the Retail Grocery Industry", Journal of 
Industrial Relations, Vol. 22, No. 3, Sep. 1980, page 275. 
"Association of Professional and Executive Staff, "Office Technology", London, 
1979, pp.29-32. 
"M. R. Freedland, "The Contract of Employment", Oxford 1976, p.41. 
la C1. 34 of the New Zealand Metropolitan, Provincial, Suburban and other News- 
I 
papers' Printing and Publishing Employees' Award (1979) Book of Awards 2457. 1 
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In the absence of such a clause Horn C.J. noted in the Law ~racfifioners' 
case that "for the purposes of the present award an industrial matter 
includes actions . . . which may have an adver\e effect on the present 
working conditions . . . of some workers presently in empl~yment"'~ and 
that "the personal grievance procedures could be used in some instances 
to protect the interest of a worker who is being adversely affected by any 
change".15 Yet, unless the change leads to the worker being treated as 
constructively dismissed and thus able to bring an action for unjustifiable 
dismissal under the section 117 grievance procedure, the alternative limb 
of that section would have to be adopted: that action by the employer 
other than unjustifiable dismissal (not being action of a kind applicable 
generally to workers of the same class employed by the employer) has 
affected the worker to his or her disadvantage. Here two problems will arise 
for the union. First, it seems likely that most issues relating to the intro- 
duction of new technology will be "action of a kind applicable generally to 
workers of the same class" and thus excluded by definition. For example, 
permanent selective introduction of POS terminals or word processors 
within the same place of employment is unlikely to occur. Secondly, even 
if this difficulty can be resolved, there are inconsistent judgments of the 
Arbitration Court as to whether any effective remedy is available under 
section 117 where the employer's action falls short of dismissal. In New 
Zealand Insurance Guild Z.U.W. v The Insurance Council o f  New Zealand 
Jamieson J .  remarked that, because subsection 7 of section 117 (which 
provides remedies) is confined to "the case of an alleged unjustifiable dis- 
missal", in cases not involving dismissal the Court can do no more than 
"make a persuasive finding".16 However subsection 4(i) of section 117 
(which applies to grievances arising both from dismissal and otherwise) 
states that the Court "may make a decision or award by way of final settle- 
ment which shall be binding on the parties". In a recent case Horn C.J. 
inferred from this latter subsection that the Court has "wide, but unspeci- 
f;ed power\" in non-dismisal case\." Tt is respectfully submitted that 
Jarnieson J.'s approach is more consistent with the drafting of the section. 
Subsection 7 since it deals expressly with the available remedies is arguably 
the dominant subsection in this respect, subsection 4(i) being concerned 
with the final stage of the standard grievance procedure. If subsection 4(i) 
is read subject to subsection 7 no inconsistency arises, the "decision or 
award" referred to by the former being limited by the plain provisions of 
the latter. If this is correct, failing coverage by an award provision, the 
worker "disadvantaged" by the introduction of new technology has no 
effective remedy under the grievance procedure unless he or she is dis- 
missed or constructively dismissed.18 In both cases it seems that the intro- 
duction of the equipment would need to be selective before the section 
"At 271. 
l6 At 273. 
'" (1976) Ind. Ct. 173 at p.179. 
l7 New Zealand Bank Officers' I.U.W. v Bank of  New Zealand (1980) Arb.Ct. 155. 
"No case brought under section 117 on the basis of "constructive dismissal" has 
succeeded to date, although the concept has been recognised: see e.g. Taylor v 
Rangiteiki Plains Dairy Company Ltd, (1980) Arb.Ct. 405. 
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could come into play at all. The same limitation would seem to apply to 
the use of the grievance procedure in respect of workers whose skills have 
been adversely affected by technological change (another category recog- 
nised as an industrial matter by Horn C.J. in the Lcrw Practitioners' case) .I9 
Here it may be noted that the new technology can have contrasting effects 
on skills. It may remove the traditional skills associated with a job and 
thus render it less satisfying (this is said the be the case e.g. with the 
replacement of "hot metal" typesetting with computer-controlled typesetting 
systems).20 Yet it may increase the skill element in some tasks so as to 
effectively "re-skill" them. In the former case compensation will be sought 
for additional monotony and in the latter a higher price will be expected in 
reward for the increased skill involved. Despite controversy elsewhere con- 
cerning the category into which the word processor falls,21 in the Law 
Practitioners' case there was consensus. The Employers' Federation stressed 
that technological innovation offered "the opportunity for job enrichment 
by reducing or eliminating the need for onerous and unpleasant tasksHzz 
and the Clerical Workers' Union argued that the word processor "requires 
further operator skills than does a typewriter [and] demands not only further 
training but a more logical and analytical approach to the 
(ii) Retraining 
In reaching its decision the Arbitration Court remarked that "[flactors 
such as retraining for other job opportunities must nevertheless be taken 
into account and doubtless will be looked at from time to time".z4 Where 
the need for retraining arises from the introduction of micro-electronic 
technology disclosure of information (and particularly the timing of such 
disclosure) becomes crucial. It has been suggested that the ideal stage for 
such disclosure is when the employer is "focussing on a range of possible 
choices for new technol~gy" .~~ But this falls within stage two of the intro- 
ductory table under (i) above and is thus outside the present ambit of 
"industrial matters". The award clause resulting from the Law Practitioners' 
case, whilst providing for affected employees to be "advised" when new 
computer technology was being "considered" and for "full consultation" 
when the decision to install had been taken. placed no time limit on these 
obligations. The requirement for employees to be advised amounts to less 
than a requirement that information be disclosed at the initial "advisory" 
stage and, in view of the jurisdictional point raised previously, "consulta- 
'@Combined Unions National Servicing Office, "Report Back of the Inter-Union 
Working Party on New Technology", unpublished paper, September 1979, para. 5. 
"See generally the Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Technological Change 
in Australia ("the Myers Report"), volume 1, paras. 3.162 to 3.169. 
Submissions, p.9. 
"At 273. 
'' G. Baker, "Microchips and Industrial Relations", Industrial Relations Journal, 
Vo. 11 No. 5, Nov/Dec 1980 page 7 at page 15. This concern was reflected in 
the written submissions to the Court by the Clerical Workers' Union (at pp.15-20) 
and the Federation of Labour (at p.7). 
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tion' 'is permitted only after the decision to install has been takeaZ6 
Moreover these obligations are unilateral rather than negotiable in nature. 
The remaining avenues for disclosure as a matter of legal obligation 
are slight. The Employer's Federation suggest as a general guideline that 
employers introducing new equipment should ensure that "all employees 
affected . . . receive accurate, clear and timely advice".27 Yet in their written 
submissions before the Court in the Law Practitioners' case the Federation 
stated that "employers cannot be too specific or categoric as to the nature 
of these changes, particular as the nature of investment decisions often 
change during eva lua t i~n" .~~ Since, by virtue of section 77(11) of the 
Industrial Relations Act 1973, employers are expressly excused from dis- 
closing such information in conciliation council it seems that the accuracy, 
clarity and timeliness of the advice suggested by the Employers' Federation 
cannot be legally enforced. Nor need such advice be given at all in the 
absence of an award clause. Where such a clause exists an employer's failure 
or refusal to consult would render the employer liable to an action for 
breach of award. But the penalty is minimal and was described as "no 
deterrent" by Sir Leonard Hadley in his dissenting opinion. 
Award clauses providing for retraining of workers on the introduction 
of new equipment or redundancy are increasingly common and present few 
legal diffic~lties.~~ In the former case it is usual for express provision to be 
made for progressive retraining of existing staff in the use of new equip- 
ment30 and such provision is well within the scope of "industrial matters"?' 
Even where retraining is not mentioned in the award, clauses providing for 
transfer to "suitable alternative employment" in lieu of redundancy have 
been held by the Arbitration Court without more to "contemplate a train- 
ing or retraining period, i.e. a period during which efficiency can be 
obtained . . . retraining is or may be part of any suitable alternative 
empl~yment" .~~ 
(iii) Redundancy and adverse effect upon opportunities 
Horn C.J. stated that "an industrial matter includes actions which may 
result in the redundancy of some worker or which may have an adverse 
effect on the . . . opportunities of some workers presently in empl~yment" .~~ 
For other limitations in the obligation to 'consult' see Cornhill Insurance Co. Lrd 
v N.Z. Insurance Guild I.U.W., unreported, Arbitration Court, Auckland, 9 Dec- 
ember 1981, (A.C. 16218, D.R. 199181). 
'' "Change for the Better", Wellington 1980, at p.16. 
Submissions, 6. 
wFor  a typical example, see clause 12 of the Motueka Abbattoir Company Limited 
Employees' Voluntary Collective Agreement (1979) Book of Awards 1277. 
"See e.g. cl. 25.1 of the New Zealand Metropolitan, Provincial, Suburban, and other 
Newspapers' Printing and Publishing Employees' Award (1979) Book of Awards 
2457. 
"D. L. Mathieson, "Industrial Law in New Zealand", Wellington 1970, p.258. R v 
Industrial Commission o f  South Australia; ex parte Adelaide Milk Supply Co- 
operative Ltd and Others (1977) 16 SASR 6, Supreme Court of South Australia. 
"New Zealand Printing and Related Trades I.U.W. v Wellington Typesetters Limited, 
unreported, Arbitration Court, Wellington, 9 March 1981, (A.C. 20181, D.R. 
240/80). 
"At 273. 
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The relationship between "industrial matters" and redundancy clauses in 
awards has been dealt with el~ewhere.~"nsofar as future opportunities are 
concerned, Horn C.J. confined the Court's jurisdiction to workers presently 
in employment. This indicates that the Court would not consider broader 
arguments concerning the high degree of "casualisation" in employment 
thought to accompany the new t e c h n o l ~ g y ~ ~  and the protection of employ- 
ment opportunities for future members of the workforc16 (women in par- 
ticulaI'3'). Such issues are beyond the traditional boundaries of industrial 
matters,3s which the Court showed no inclination to extend. 
Although the installation of micro-electronic technology is not considered 
arbitrable it will continue to play a significant role in bargaining within the 
formal system. The threat to change from labour intensive production to 
capital intensive methods ("machines don't strike or work to rule"39) is 
already a bargaining factor in award negotiation. Unions which are well 
placed to enforce agreements outside the institutions of the Industrial Rela- 
tions Act have reacted by negotiating and enforcing restrictions on the 
installation of technology. As one union secretary (and industrial lawyer) 
recently remarked of conciliation councils, "beneath the legal rules there is 
an underlying reality which determines the responses of both parties, and 
. . . this reality is about bargaining strength not fair play in accordance with 
the law".40 The trend that can be expected to continue is for stronger unions 
to move away from inslitutionalised coliective bargaining on technology, 
preferring instead informal "single-issue" bargaining. The notable examples 
are the recent informal agreements in the freezing industry. As these pro- 
hibit the introduction of new technology unless agreement has been reached 
in joint consultation or, in the event of impasse, supported by the decision 
"Hughes, op.cit., note 34. 
'"ew Zealand Shop Employees' Association, "Microprocessors in the Retail Indus- 
try", Paper delivered to the Combined Unions Technology Conference, April 9 
and 10, 1980, p.3. 
"The Director of the Research and Planning Division of the Department of Labour, 
recently forecast "enormous changes in the workplace, probably involving further 
losses of many of the jobs which have traditionally absorbed unskilled school 
leavers" ("New Technologies and Industrial Relations", Industrial Relations Centre, 
Victoria University of Wellington, 1980). 
"See "The New Technology and the Employment of Women". P.S.A. Research 
Discussion Paper No. 15 and Vocational Training Council "The Impact of New 
Technology on the Training and Employment of Women", Women's Advisory 
Committee Discussion Paper. 
"See R v Portus; ex parte Australia and New Zealar~d Bankirtg Group Ltd (1972) 
127 CLR 353 at p.359 per Menzies J.; ". . . the matter in dispute must be one 
within the sphere of the relations of the businessman as employer with a person as 
employee". 
39 The Executive Director of the Employers' Federation, quoted in the "Proceedings", 
note 36 supra, at p.44. 
" J.  Reid, "Lawyers in the Industrial Arena", A.U.L.S.A. Paper 1980. 
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of a disputes ~ o m m i t t e e , ~ ~  their terms are wider in scope than the original 
claim in the Law Practitioners' case. Contrary to the Court's justification for 
refusing to sanction that claim, Part I of this article shows that there is no 
legal obstacle to the inclusion of such agreements within the conciliation and 
arbitration system. 
Nor do the implications end with the law on industrial bargaining. The 
alleged consequences of introducing new technology include higher unem- 
ployment, redundancies, de-skilling, declining pay differentials, inter-union 
disputes and new hazards at The Arbitration Court is already 
familiar with demarcation disputes and redundancy claims arising from this 
source.43 The fundamental question now is "whether the traditional New 
Zealand approach to industrial relations, industrial conciliation and arbi- 
tration, can cope with the stresses placed upon it by the new technologies": 44 
the Law Practitioners' decision does little to suggest that it can. 
41Consultation Agreement between the New Zealand Federation of Labour and the 
Auckland Farmers Freezing Co-operative Limited, 13th January 198 1 ; Agreement 
between the New Zealand Freezing and Related Industries Clerical Officers I.U.W. 
and the Hawkes Bay Farmers Meat Company, 10th April 1981. 
" G. Barker, "Microchips and Industrial Relations", Industrial Relations Journal, 
Vol. 11, No. 5, Nov/Dec 1980, p.71. 
Canterbury Clerical Workers Z.U.W. v N.Z .  Printing, etc. I.U.W. and Christclzurch 
Press, unreported, Arbitration Court, Christchurch, 20 November 1981, (A.C. 
154181). 
"F. J. L. Young, introduction to "Proceedings of a Seminar: New Technologies and 
Industrial Relations", note 36 supra. 
